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Introduction: Metalinguistic and possible worlds approaches to
counterfactuals
CCounterfactuals are a class of conditionals, or if-then statements” (Barker109). A major issue in the counterfactuals literature is whether counter-factual propositions have truth conditionals which may be defined in a
non-circular manner. The two dominant perspectives that have offered alternative
answers to the truth-conditionals of counterfactual propositions are the metalin-
guistic approach and that of other possible worlds.
The theory of counterfactuals has been widely applied in economic1 and
management sciences, including marketing.2 Among the various facets of
the counterfactuals literature that have been addressed by branches of phi-
losophy and linguistics, such as philosophy of language, logical semantics,
linguistic semantics, modal fictionalism, pragmatics, I am focusing on the
specific topic of possible worlds. In particular, by drawing on semantics,
textual semiotics and rhetoric, I am addressing how fictive elements, em-
bedded in a fabular world and once conceived of as counterfactual, achieve
to be actualized in advertising discourse as part of our cultural world. By
adopting Eco’s fundamental premise that our world is first and foremost
culturally constituted, and by recruiting rhetoric as an essential comple-
ment of a hybrid semantic/textual semiotic approach, I venture into the
fantasy island of cinematic and literary fiction, only to show that this and
other possible worlds are not that far apart. The managerial applications
for brand genealogists, but also in terms of developing advertising texts
by drawing on a combinatorial logic of properties and individuals from
fictive worlds, are highlighted as an addendum to the practical implica-
tions of philosophical and semiotic theory. 
11. See, for example, G. S. Murphy, “On Counterfactual Propositions”, History and Theory
Vol.9 (1969): 14-38. 
1 2. See the special issue of Psychology & Marketing (Vol. 17.4, 2000) on counterfactual think-
ing, focusing on psychological aspects of counterfactuals from a cognitive psychological
point of view.  
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A fundamental principle of the metalinguistic approach is that “(AàB) is
true iff [if and only if] there is an X that meets some specified condition and is
such that (A & X) entails B or, equivalently, B is deducible from (A & X)” (Jack-
son 215). 
According to Lewis, a prominent representative of the other possible worlds
approach which is of focal concern in this paper, “the central notion of a possible
worldly semantics for counterfactuals is a relation of comparative similarity be-
tween worlds. One world is said to be closer to actuality than another if the first
resembles the actual world more than the second does” (Menzies). Lewis further
contends that “reasoning about truth in fiction is very like counterfactual reason-
ing […]. We depart from actuality as far as we must reach a possible world, where
the counterfactual supposition comes true” (Lewis, Philosophical Papers 269). 
I will exemplify, in due course, how what once appeared in the context of a
fabula or fictive story in a world W becomes actualised in a world W′. In Coun-
terfactuals (86), Lewis defined actuality in indexical3 terms, as follows: “‘Actual’
is indexical, like ‘I’ or ‘here’ or ‘now’: it depends for its reference on the cir-
cumstances of utterance”. Bonomi and Zucchi further qualified these circum-
stantial factors in terms of genre conventions, in a manner akin to inter-textual
theory. Complementary to Counterfactuals, Lewis’s work Truth in Fiction
(which appeared in an updated version in Philosophical Papers I) is a precursor
to contemporary philosophical approaches to film theory, which have imported
concepts from a wide range of philosophical perspectives (Read and Goode-
nough; Sanders; Mulhall), but also from psychoanalysis (Žižek) and rhetoric
(Blakesley).  
The fundamental premise that undergirds Lewis’s version of the possible
worlds theory consists in the acknowledgement of the world wherein a fictive
person or a state-of-affairs is embedded, such as the world of Sherlock Holmes,
as a sufficient condition for formulating truthful propositions about persons or
states-of-affairs. “We sometimes speak of the world of a fiction. What is true in
the Holmes stories is what is true, as we say, ‘in the world of Sherlock Holmes’”
(Lewis, Philosophical 269). This core premise has been rendered in the notation
of modal fictionalism as follows: “P iff according to PW, P*”, where “PW” is
the fiction of possible worlds, P is any proposition, and P* is its possible-worlds
“paraphrase” (Nolan, “Modal Fictionalism”). 
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1 3. Lewis’s realist account of possible worlds has been criticised by Stalnaker’s mild realism
perspective and by Rosen’s modal fictionalist perspective (see Hale), among others. For a
tentative criticism of Lewis’s indexicality conditional for conferring judgments about “ac-
tuality”, see Wittgenstein’s argumentation about ostension and the dependence of indexicals
on language-games (PI.28: “An ostensive definition can be variously interpreted in every
case”; PI.33: “Suppose someone points to a vase and says ‘Look at that marvelous blue –
the shape isn’t the point’”), and Thomasson’s modal fictionalist standpoint that posits tex-
tual conditions for indexical expressions, as referred to in this paper.  Eco (Lector in fabula
176) also assumes a clear non-indexicals dependent position on actuality. 
How to get there from here in two basic steps: Textual semiotic
OOOticket-to-ride
There are significant differences and similarities between philosophy of language
perspectives, logical semantics and textual semiotics, a thorough investigation
of which exceeds the focus of this paper. The conceptual armory of propositional
logic is not sufficiently equipped in order to account not for truth and/or asserta-
bility conditions of individual propositions, but for how the truth of a text, from
a macrosemantic (Rastier, “Macrosémantique”) point of view, is instituted as a
result of a text’s peculiar logic, but also in interaction with other texts at an inter-
textual level (in terms of the “megasemantics” of the corpus; Rastier, “Passages
et parcours”). Without going into detail about the plethora of theories of truth
(see Walker) and their subtle nuances, what is of paramount importance for the
argument put forward in this paper is the distinction between reference as agree-
ment between a logically formulated proposition and a state-of-affairs (from a
naive realist point of view) and anaphora, as the establishment of intra- and inter-
textual referential relationships.
As will be shown, the possibility of other possible worlds is a direct conse-
quence of an anaphoric relationship among elements and properties that span
multiple texts, as well as rhetorical operations that allow for their variable con-
figuration. This inter-textual anaphoric relationship, from a modal fictionalist
point of view, resonates in the constant dependence of a fictive character on a
literary oeuvre (or other corpuses in this respect). “If a fictional character depends
on a work of literature about it and a work of literature depends on some copy
of it, then a fictional character depends on some copy of work of literature about
it” (Thomasson 34). ”It is by way of the textual foundation of a fictive character
that one may make an indexical kind of reference” (Thomasson 49), thus achiev-
ing to root a fictive character in the actual world. 
Eco propounded in Lector in fabula an approach to how other possible
worlds4 may be conceived and realised by putting forward a hybrid theoretical
framework that combined elements from philosophy of language, semantics,
modal logic, psycholinguistics, Peircean and structuralist semiotics, narrative
theory and rhetoric (among others).  The argumentative thrust put forward in
Lector in fabula5 about other possible worlds is intent on mapping out how
worldly structures emerge at the intersection between this world (W) and another
possible world (W′). From a textual semiotic point of view, which is concerned
with cultural rather than natural phenomena, the theory of counterfactuals is ap-
pealing insofar as it raises the issue of similarity about this and other possible
worlds. This issue calls for a structural matrix whereby a homogeneity may be
created between possible worlds, as will be sketched out below. 
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1 4. See Copeland for a historical evolution of possible world semantics. 
1 5. Eco defines fabula as the fundamental schema of narration or the semantic substratum of
narratives.   
At the heart of Eco’s textual semiotic approach lies the notion of encyclo-
pedic knowledge as the ability to make inferences about possible alternative
routes of a story’s deployment (which concerns the “what if…?” counterpart of
counterfactuals) based on accumulated knowledge, but also as the ability to make
sense of fictive characters, fictive worlds and endow them with meaning. The
encyclopedia hypothesis has also been endorsed in film semantic/semiotic ap-
proaches (Bordwell). Inferential propositions concerning relationships among
persons, events and states-of-affairs are accomplished in an encyclopedic context
in the form of what Eco (Lector) calls inferential walks (or inferential tickets, in
Ryle’s terms; Jackson 219). Encyclopedic knowledge on the part of a reader is
evinced in a phenomenological structure of foresight. The structure of foresight
complements the logico-semantic approach to counterfactuals and other possible
worlds, which hinges on modal logic.
Eco (Lector) contends that it is difficult to proceed with a groundwork project
of conditions of foresight pertaining to states of the fabula without a textual semi-
otic account of other possible worlds. Since the notion of other possible worlds
was popularised by logical semantics (even though it was imported to the disci-
pline by literary studies), a textual semiotic account is bound to engage critically
with argumentation offered within the contours of logical semantics. In this sense,
Eco (Lector 168) defines possible worlds as “a state of affairs that is expressed
by a set of propositions, where for each proposition either p or -p holds”. Each
world is made up of individual entities that carry properties or actions. A world
structure may be portrayed through a structural matrix (see Table 1) and rules of
transformation among possible worlds, which will be described in terms of rhetor-
ical operations in due course. According to Eco, each maximal set of propositions
constitutes the book of a world, in the sense of if a book about world W is a set
of propositions S and proposition p is a member of the set S, then p implies and
is implied in world W.  This view of a worldly structure is coupled with proposi-
tional attitudes6 such as belief, desire, and as already argued, foresight. 
Rhetorical operations and propositional attitudes as conditions of
OOOpossibility of other worlds
From a textual semiotic point of view, Eco contends that the concept of possible
worlds is not vacuous. Possible worlds are always already populated by expres-
sive elements or, as he puts it, they are furnished. I will be exemplifying key ar-
guments of the textual semiotic approach to possible worlds by allusion to the
film The Curious Case of Benjamin Button7 (starring Brad Pitt and Cate
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1 6. “Propositional attitude ascriptions – sentences such as ‘Margaret believes that Tom is in
Australia’ – are ones whose main verb is a verb of propositional attitude. Common to such
sentences is that they ascribe psychological states (such as belief and desire) or speech acts
(assertions, suggestions, and so forth)” (Stern 186; also see Richard for a critical engage-
ment with various philosophical perspectives on propositional attitudes).
1 7. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Curious_Case_of_Benjamin_Button_%28film%29
Blanchett) as the argumentation progresses. The Curious Case of Benjamin But-
ton recites the story of a fictive person (Benjamin Button) who was born with
the myoskeletal system of an old man and who became younger as he aged. In
the end, following this counterfactual line of reasoning to its limits, instead of
dying, Benjamin Button was reborn.
Furthermore, “a possible world is a cultural construction” (Eco Lector, 170),
while, from a constructivist point of view of possible worlds, “even the real world
of reference must be understood as a cultural construction” (184). Eco’s con-
tention that the real world is indissociable from and is in fact conditioned by cul-
ture is amply evinced in the consumption of films (see Holbrook and Hirschman),
where imaginary signifiers manage to delineate readers’/viewers’ background
expectations (their phenomenological foresight) by furnishing concrete
frames/scripts which function anaphorically as a regulative principle for  recog-
nizing  concrete events in the “real” world as more or less probable, but also as
macrostructures or global inter-textual referential structures. For example, with
regard to The Curious Case of Benjamin Button, the fictive tale of a person be-
coming younger as he grows older is abstracted to a macroproposition in the
form of “It is possible in another world that is different to the one we currently
inhabit that a person may become younger as he grows older”, which installs a
macrostructure in memory in the form of “time may be reversed”. This pattern
is also encountered in ordinary discourse (“What would you do if you could
bring back time…?”). The relationship between a macrostructure and a set of
macropropositions that have been abstracted through inferential derivation rules,
such as deletion, selection, generalization, construction (Van Dijk) from the ex-
posure to imaginary filmic texts, is inter-textual.  Macrostructures migrate from
one text to another, while crossing genres, such as between a cinematic text and
an ad text. In line with Grive, each text is situated in a universe of texts, which
led the author to formulate the maxim “il n’est de texte que d’intertexte”. Inter-
textuality complements encyclopedic knowledge by endowing readers with an
inter -textual competence (Kristeva; Eco, Lector).  
The rhetorical notion of anaphora and more precisely of anaphoric relation-
ships, poses a challenge to the notion of reference in the context of the corre-
spondence theory of truth (a naively realist approach that largely undergirds
everyday discourse), where propositions are supposed to have an extra-textual
referent and transcendent truth conditions (see Hale), independent of context of
use (Wittgenstein) from a pragmatic point of view, and of propositional attitudes
from a modal logical perspective.
From a modal logical point of view, as Hintikka contends, propositional at-
titudes (and their modal contexts) do not exhibit any failure of referentiality, but
only referential multiplicity.  From a textual semiotic point of view, what anaphora
points to is that reference is always already a nexus of inter-textual referential re-
lationships among events, persons, states-of-affairs that are part and parcel of
one’s encyclopedic knowledge, conditioned by one’s intertextual competence. 
By virtue of memory’s ability to generate macropropositions and store them
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in the form of macrostructures, consumers have the ability to make sense of con-
crete scenaria offered by advertisers in variable instances of their life-world.  One
may not recall Benjamin Button in ten years’ time, but one may be capable of
recognizing a time-reversal pattern in another script as possible. What was tech-
nically formulated in cognitivist terms by Van Dijk as macropropositions, has
been iterated by Eco in rhetorical terms as topoi. In fact, what difference may be
discerned between a psychic and a rhetorical topography, if not a notional one,
as already shown by Freud in the psychic structure that was put forward in the
Interpretation of Dreams, which boils down to a vast network of metaphors and
metonymies instituted at the intersection between latent and manifest dream con-
tent? (Rossolatos).8 If a macrostructure is indistinguishable from a rhetorical topo-
logical mechanism, then memory is indistinguishable from an enthymematic net-
work of loci communes or rhetorical topoi. “The activation of a scenario (more-
over an inter-textual one) signifies recourse to a topos” (Eco Lector 154). Hence,
a rhetorical philosophical account of how topoi are created is not necessarily re-
ducible to cognitivism, or at least not as a dominant paradigm, but approachable
via a tropological interpretive framework that is capable of demonstrating how a
mise-en-scène is equivalent to a mise-en-trope (Klinkenberg). Moreover, this
rhetorical turn in theorizing how inter-textual discursive formations are enacted
through multiple narratives points to a rhetorical dendrite structure, whereby what
is more and what is less contiguous is a matter of anaphorical relations instituted
through acts of mise-en-trope. The difference between viewing possible worlds
from a logical-semantic and from a rhetorical textual semiotic point of view, or
the point of intersection between the two perspectives, consists in the latter’s en-
riching the former with operations of semantic transformation. I will now exem-
plify this point with reference to the “fictive” world of Benjamin Button.
This film maintains the cycle of birth and death, albeit in reverse. It invites
viewers to make sense of the story by seeking recourse to uniform encyclopedic
knowledge macrostructures about the evolutionary pattern of human life, while
applying a minimal probability conditional in terms of temporality. What is
evoked counterfactually as an inferential walk in this film is not the truth value
of a set of assertoric propositions concerning the truthfulness of discrete episodes
about Buttons’s life, but the notion of probability itself, and the extent to which
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1 8. In terms of tropical or figurative language, as Stern suggests, the bulk of philosophy of
language approaches have been concerned with literal, rather than tropical propositions,
that is propositions that feature rhetorical tropes and whose meaning is altered by virtue of
the incidence of rhetorical tropes.  Despite the significant strides that have been accom-
plished in the field of semantics (and pragmatics) over the past 30 years with a view to ac-
counting for figurative language, the analysis of rhetorical discourse  rests primarily within
the province of rhetoric. Rhetorical semiotics seeks to combine rhetorical theory with semi-
otic approaches and yield a coherent theoretical framework, coupled with an extensive tax-
onomy of rhetorical figures and rhetorical operations. Groupe μ’s  Rhétorique générale,
on which I shall draw in part in this paper, constitutes a seminal work in this direction. 
an impossible scenario in all possible worlds may be fleshed out in the context
of fiction. As Groupe μ (143) contends, “films remind us that it is possible to
permute [change the order of] elements of the real”. The crux of the argument
about the textual semiotic structure of this film is that by inscribing such an ex-
treme counterfactual scenario in an audience’s memory structure, it immediately
enriches encyclopedic knowledge, by opening it up to extreme probabilities. En-
cyclopedic knowledge and, by implication, intertextual competence assume en-
hanced validity once inscribed in an intersubjective trajectory. 
Non-real objects [my note: and states-of-affairs] may be either autonomous
(ideal) objects or intentional objects such as fictional or mythical characters.
Purported intentional entities are admitted as intentional objects wherever
we have adequate intersubjective access in referential acts, especially on
the basis of a linguistic structure such as a work of literature. Intentional
objects then have a peculiar double structure: they possess not only prop-
erties (Eigenschaften) but also an inner stock of ‘characteristics’ (Merk-
male) which they are merely ascribed. (Smith, “Frege and Husserl” 119)
The collective memory as set of macrostructures that is conditioned by the fabula
has also been addressed by Lewis (Philosophical 271), who argues that assuming
“by way of idealization, that the beliefs overt in the community are each possible
and jointly compossible […] we can assign to the community a set of possible
worlds, called the collective belief worlds of the community, comprising exactly
those worlds where the overt beliefs all come true”.  The ascription of belief
structures is an essential aspect of the possible worlds theory, hence it is advisable
to dwell on it a bit further. According to Hintikka (at least as put forward in Mod-
els for Modalities), the attribution of a belief structure may be summarised in
the following way (Woodruff Smith 323): 
(i) a believes that p = in all the possible worlds compatible with what a be-
lieves, it is the case that p.
This proposition is reformulated in order to encompass its truth conditionals as
follows: 
(ii) ‘a believes that p’ is true in w iff for every possible world w′ compatible
with what the person referred to by ‘a’ in w believes in w, ‘p’ is true in ‘w’.
And it is further reformulated with a view to accounting for the contextual factor
of α’s belief system qua compatibility principle that conditions the existence of
p in possible worlds as follows: 
(iii) ‘a believes that p’ is true in a world w iff ‘p’ is true in all the possible
worlds compatible with everything a believes in w. 
Smith extended Hintikka’s propositional attitudes theory by drawing on Husser-
lian phenomenological logic and particularly on the notions of noema9 and hori-
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1 9. “Husserl introduced the technical term noema in Ideas I (1913) to denote the intentional
object of conscious experience. In that work he describes the intentionality of experience
as a noesis-noema correlation. Whereas noesis refers to a real (reell) content of experience,
zon.10 Without going into details about the lengthy discussions the distinction
between meaning (Sinn) and reference (Bedeutung) has spawned among various
philosophical circles, I shall concentrate on the interpretive merits of the em-
ployment of these Husserlian notions for shedding further light on how belief
structures instantiate foresight about possible worlds. “The Husserlian possible-
worlds theory of intentionality associates with each act of consciousness both a
noema and a horizon of possible worlds compatible with what the Sinn of this
noema prescribes” (Smith 311). In crude terms, an object is constituted by a noe-
matic act of consciousness, which posits it in a horizon of meaning. An object is
appropriated by a consciousness insofar as it enters its horizon and it is this hori-
zon that determines (prescribes) its existence in this and any other possible world.
How does a belief structure tie up with acts of consciousness as noematic acts?
A typical example of how an act of consciousness institutes its object as a noe-
matic structure, according to Smith, is the existence of Santa Claus. Since Santa
Claus does not exist in the actual world, an act of consciousness is not directed
toward some object in the actual world. However, Santa Claus does exist in var-
ious possible worlds insofar as they are compatible with what the Sinn (meaning)
of a noematic act of expectation or belief prescribes. “According to a Husserlian
theory, then, an act of expecting Santa Claus is directed to a merely possible ob-
ject, an object that exists in various possible worlds, not in the actual world”
(Smith 312). However, insofar as the belief system of a allows for the appropri-
ation in the horizon of its intentionality of an object in any possible world and
given that the belief system is responsible for maintaining homogeneity between
the actual and possible worlds and that the object’s existence is anchored in a’s
noematic structure, then there is no difference between the existence of Santa
Claus in this or in any other possible world.
For Husserl, a propositional act or attitude consists in a person’s entertaining
a noema whose Sinn is a propositional sense, whereby a state of affairs is
intended. A belief is a propositional attitude whose noema’s thetic compo-
nent is doxic. A belief consists, then, we may say, in a person’s doxically
entertaining a propositional sense. (Smith 348; my emphasis) 
Smith combines Hintikka’s possible world semantics, as described above, with
Husserl’s intentionality horizon in the following manner. He denotes the inten-
tionality horizon by the function HB, which comprises three arguments, viz. per-
son (s), propositional sense (π) and world (w). HΒ (s, π w) is the set of worlds
that make up the horizon of s’s belief in w with sense π. The referent in w is the
state of affairs (recalling that for Husserl the referent is reducible to an intended
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viz., the meaning-intention which is directed toward an object in a determinate manner
and with a certain positional or thetic characteristic, noema refers to the intentional con-
tent of the experience, its ‘objective’ correlate, i.e., the intentional object or the object as
intended” (Drummond 144).  
10. “An act’s horizon maps out an array of possible states of affairs that fill in what is left ‘open’
or ‘indeterminate’ by the noema of the act itself. In this way Husserlian horizon analysis
can be seen as anticipating the analysis of meaning in terms of possible world semantics,
developed by Saul Kripke and Jaakko Hintikka” (Smith and Woodruff Smith 25-26).
state-of-affairs by a noematic act) which consists in α’s doxically entertaining
the propositional sense I(‘p’). By virtue of the propositional sense, a state-of-
affairs R(‘p’, ‘w’) in every possible world w′ may be intended. In this manner,
the above-formulated proposition (iii), in the light of Husserlian phenomenolog-
ical logic, is rendered as follows: 
(iv) a believes that p’ is true in a world w iff in w a doxically entertains the
propositional sense I(‘p’), such that, for every possible world w′ in the hori-
zon Hb(a, I(‘p’), w), there obtains in w′ the state of affairs designated in w′
by I(‘p’) – so that ‘p’ is true in w′.
In other words, the further qualification of proposition (iii) that is effected by
proposition (iv) by recourse to Husserlian phenomenological logic consists in
anchoring the belief structure of person a in the horizon of its intentionality,
which is responsible for conferring meaning to an intended state-of-affairs that
may hold in a possible world w′ by virtue of being embedded in its intentionality
horizon. Hence, a subject does not simply entertain an impression that a state-
of-affairs may be true in another possible world, but a state-of-affairs is always
already true qua meaningful insofar as it is part of what may be intended in its
horizon of intentionality that produces the counter-factual state-of-affairs in a
noematic act.  
In the light of the above, the declarative proposition “p (Benjamin is a sailor
in stage X of his life)” is recognizable as truthful insofar as p is part of a cultur-
ally shared book as set of propositions S that makes up this world W. The coun-
terfactual proposition “p (Benjamin becomes younger as he grows older)” is
counterfactual insofar as in S that allows us to make sense of W, this proposition
is inherently contradictory, as it reverses the transition from p to -p, based on
what is expected in S. It is a counterfactual state-of-affairs. However, if we are
cognizant of the rhetorical operation of inversion, which would suggest that the
succession from p to -p may be inversed in another possible world, then the re-
versal of the aging pattern may be recognised as valid, as a probability inscribed
in S. Thus, it is the rhetorical pattern imposed by the operation of inversion
(which, for Groupe μ, amounts to an operation of metalogism, that is a change
of the logical value of a proposition) that enables us to confer judgments about
the validity of such a proposition. “What is condemned by logicians, is of interest
to rhetoric” (Groupe μ 129). The constant rhetorical inversions in the context of
Benjamin Button confer a truth value to counterfactual propositions, as they are
embedded in a rhetorical strategy of semantic reorientation, evinced in recurrent
sequences of inversions among life-stages. In this context, the truthfulness of a
proposition is established by a rhetorical operation in tandem with a propositional
attitude, such as desire and belief.  It is the belief and desire structure of a wish
to be ever-young that confers truth value to the story. Insofar as a cultural book
S is made up of propositions, but also of modes of relatedness among proposi-
tions, unless these modes are addressed first and foremost qua propositional at-
titudes and rhetorical operations, the truth of a text may not be judged as such. 
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Eco exemplifies his textual semiotic approach to counterfactuals by allusion
to the fabula of Little Red Riding Hood. The narrative world of Little Red Riding
Hood is furnished with a limited number of individuals (a little girl, a grand-
mother, a wolf, a forest) and a limited number of properties. The attribution of
properties to individuals in this fable follows in some respects the rules of the
cultural book S (for example, the population of a forest by trees), whereas in
other aspects it deviates from the rules of book S, such as in the portrayal of a
talking wolf. 
In the province of this narrative world, individuals adopt particular propo-
sitional attitudes, such as the belief endorsed by Little Red Riding Hood that the
wolf is her grandmother. This propositional attitude is translated by Eco, in modal
logical (but also Husserlian/phenomenological) terms, as a doxastic structure.
The properties ascribed to these individuals constitute in logical-semantic terms
(here Eco follows Hintikka) semantic primitives (realist/nominalist objections
aside for the sake of the argument).
The primitive properties of a riding hood that may be variably combined in
different possible worlds are ‘round’ and ‘red’. In this way, possible worlds the-
ory is used as a modeling device (cf. Nolan, “Possible World Semantics” 245).
Based on this simple schema, the following four individuals may be constructed
in different possible worlds:
Table 1. Co-occurrence of logical properties making up






The combinatory approach that hinges on semantic primitives is one aspect
of the counterfactuals argumentation. The other major aspect concerns the very
distinction between “actual” world and possible worlds and, by implication, to
what extent in a cultural universe the former is conditioned by narrative possi-
bilities opened up by fictive texts. Let us explore each one of these issues in turn.
If in the context of an experiential marketing event in a shopping mall, for
example, that capitalises on the Little Red Riding Hood fable an actor instanti-
ates the fictive constellation of a talking wolf, he essentially achieves to flesh
out a narratively constructed figure. In this instance, the talking wolf becomes
part of the cultural book S and hence an instance of activation of the property
“talking” for an individual “wolf” in world W. Insofar as reality is a cultural
construct, based on Eco’s definition, and given that a brand culture has inscribed
the once fictive concatenation of a talking wolf in a cultural framework, it has
managed to generate a homogeneity between an initial world W and a counter-
factual world W′. 
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Rapunzel for life(world): hair-extension is fabular
The conditioning of a cultural world by the fabula, as a fleshing out of a fictive
persona and the capitalization of a mythic property attributed to a figure in the
context of a fable, is evinced most strikingly in the example of the “Twisted Fairy-
tales” commercial series of GHD Hair Appliances. The series featured fabular
personas, such as Rapunzel and Cinderella, and the strap-line “You can do any-
thing with your hair”. The maximal proposition “you can do anything with your
hair” encapsulates counterfactuality in the brand’s textual universe, by inscribing
the non-existing property “extremely long hair” in the cultural book S of this world
W. Even though in this world hair as long as Rapunzel’s is non-existant, in the
fictive world of the Rapunzel fabula such long hair is possible. This counterfactual
possibility is re-inscribed in the ad text of GHD by making a concrete brand prom-
ise “your hair can be as long as Rapunzel’s”. At the same time, the actorial man-
ifestation of Rapunzel in the context of GHD’s commercial invalidates Kripke’s
argument that fictive names do not have a spatiotemporal referent. Furthermore,
the pragmatic dimension of the fictive character of Rapunzel reinforces its exis-
tence in this world, insofar as it incites consumers to engage with the brand prom-
ise, brought forth by a fictive persona in terms of an actual purchase act. 
By analogy, in literary works, such as Anna Karenina, readers engage with
a fictive character directly through an emotional response to the vagaries with
which the hero is laden (Holt). As Glezakou stresses, based on the emotional re-
sponses of readers, fictive characters are not mere abstracta. Again, the truth-
condition of this proposition is not logical, but rhetorical. It verges on the rhetor-
ical operation of metalogism/adjunction and the figure of hyperbole, situated in
the rhetorically configured context of a parable that suggests that extremely long
hair is a means to achieving various goals, from mundane, such as more efficient
house-cleaning (as suggested in the Rapunzel fabula) to aspirational, such as at-
taining royalty status as suggested by implication in the correlation between the
differentially defining property of having extremely long hair and being the
daughter of a royal couple. “A possible world is in effect what a complete novel
describes” (Hintikka 154). At the same time, the referent of the individual Ra-
punzel is inter-textually anaphoric. It is anchored in and constantly dependent
on the fabula of Rapunzel, as part of a cultural literary heritage that is synchron-
ically co-present (Plett) with Rapunzel’s inscription in the ad text, and not on a
“real” (extra-textual) person, which legitimates Eco’s (Lector 184) foundational
premise, from a constructivist point of view, that reality is a cultural construct.
In this manner, “a narrative world endows the real world with its individuals and
properties” (Eco Lector 174).
Complementary to this textual semiotic approach to counterfactuals, one
should add propositional attitudes and technological means. When Rapunzel was
written and circulated, it was hardly credible that someone could have such long
hair. It was part of a fabula, and perhaps recognised as such. However, with the
advent of the hair-extension technology, one may make an effortless conjecture
that the acquisition of such long hair is not an untenable project. Hence, what
once counted as a counterfactual proposition today is a “real” mainstream prac-
tice. As if by prophetic foresight, Rapunzel antedated an embedded cultural prac-
tice, that of hair-extension.
The theory of counterfactuals also poses a question as regards the time-hal-
lowed Aristotelian distinction between necessary and accidental properties. Eco
(Lector 186) contends that a property is topic-sensible; the minimal structure of
a world is established within the contours of a textual topic. Hence, the property
“length” that is predicated of Rapunzel’s hair is essential in the context of the
topic of the fable, which suggests that Rapunzel cannot have shorter hair (if her
supernatural powers are still to hold true; a property that was prevalent in earlier
stories, such as that of Samson, and in the Torah, where long hair is matched
with magical properties). Essential properties are not necessary, but gestaltic
building blocks of possible world structures, as an interplay between a gestaltic11
figure or global identity structure (see Rosenthal and Visetti), and atomic prop-
erties that are embedded in schemata. The interplay between schema12 and prop-
erties allows for migration to possible worlds and the maintenance of homogene-
ity between this (W) and that (W′) world.13
Conclusion: implications for consumer research
The textual/constructivist nature of cultural discourses, such as advertising, and
their “real-world” implications have been repeatedly stressed in the advertising
(Cook) and consumer research (Hackley) literatures. The modes whereby adver-
tising textual constructivism spawns possible worlds at the intertextual cross-
roads with literature and film is an under-explored research area, even more so
from a hybrid logical semantic/ textual semiotic/rhetorical point of view. 
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11. Gestaltism has also been operationalised by Branigan in order to show how the cognitive
processing of films takes place, that is via both top-down and bottom-up processes. “Top-
down processes often treat data as an inductive sample to be projected and tested within a
variety of parallel frames of reference while bottom-up processes are highly specialised
and atomistic” (Branigan 37). 
12. “Cognitive psychologists deﬁne schemata as abstract, transcendental, static, top-down
(rather than bottom-up) structures of the mind that organise perceptual input into coherent
mental representations. Schemata are therefore ﬁnite abstract structures that interact with
an inﬁnite amount of perceptual data to form experiences. In this sense, schemata constitute
the generative capacity of the mind to comprehend perceptions recurrently” (Buckland 29).
Branigan (13) defines schema as “an arrangement of knowledge already possessed by a
perceiver that is used to predict and classify new sensory data”. The process of schematism
“describes how a reader collects a series of episodes into a focused causal chain (as opposed
to a ‘heap,’ ‘catalogue,’ ‘unfocused chain, etc.)” (36). Branigan outlines eight key compo-
nents of a filmic narrative schema, viz. abstract, orientation, initiating event, goal, compli-
cating action, climax/resolution, epilogue and narration (18).
13. This point has been partially endorsed by Lewis, who claimed that “some of the similarities
most important to us involve idiosyncratic, subtle, Gestalt properties” (Lewis, Counter-
factuals 95).
Along with a demonstration of how rhetorical figures are responsible for
shaping macrostructures about possible worlds and the influence propositional
attitudes exert in that direction, this paper points to the benefits stemming from
possible worlds theory, in terms of a structural matrix for gauging essential and
accidental properties of fictive characters and their worldly structures. 
The logical implications of the argumentation that was pursued in this paper
potentially urge consumer researchers to map out consumers’ memory macrostruc-
tures and macropropositions in terms of inter-textual anaphoric relationships and
abstract schemata, in short their encyclopedic universe. Furthermore, it invites
brand genealogists to map out how brand discourses have been crystallised as con-
crete scripts, and as vehicles of macropropositions or depth-logical relations that
underpin various manifest narratives, in relationship to consumers’ encyclopedic
universes. 
University of Kassel, Germany
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